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Abstract 
 
What is the role of firms and markets in mediating the division of labor?  This 
paper uses confidential microdata from the Census of Services to examine law 
firms' boundaries.  We find that firms’ field scope narrows as market size 
increases and individuals specialize, indicating that firms’ boundaries reflect 
organizational trade-offs. Moreover, we find that whether the division of labor is 
mediated by firms differs systematically according to whether lawyers in a 
particular field are mainly involved in structuring transactions or in dispute 
resolution.  We then analyze which types of specialists tend to work in the same 
firm and which tend not to do so.  Our evidence leads us to eliminate risk-sharing 
as an important determinant of firms’ field boundaries, and narrows the set of 
possible monitoring or knowledge sharing explanations.  Our findings show how 
the incentive trade-offs associated with exploiting increasing returns from 
specialization help lead the structure of the industry to be fragmented, but highly-
skewed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As economists since Adam Smith have observed, individuals tend to become more 
specialized as the size of the market increases. Once individuals specialize, economic institutions 
become necessary to mediate relationships among them. When is the division of labor efficiently 
mediated by firms?  When is it efficiently mediated by markets?  In addressing these questions, 
we seek to illuminate the role firms and markets play in the organization of human capital.  This 
organizational issue has become increasingly salient as service sectors’ share of developed 
economies has grown, because these sectors tend to be human capital-intensive.1 
This paper investigates the determinants of law firms’ field boundaries.  Our analysis 
relies on law office-level data collected by the Bureau of the Census.  A key question in the 
survey form law offices receive asks how many lawyers in the office specialize in each of 13 
areas of the law.  This question provides evidence not only on law firms’ scope, but also on the 
scope of individual lawyers’ expertise.  It allows us to examine patterns of individual 
specialization, how specialists are organized into firms, and relationships between the two: how 
does the division of labor across individuals affect the division of labor across firms?  The data 
provide us a rare opportunity to empirically investigate the organization of human capital, and 
study the role of firms in facilitating specialization. 
We employ two empirical approaches.  The first approach investigates whether and how 
firms’ boundaries are sensitive to the division of labor.  We investigate whether lawyers field-
specialize more as market size increases, and if so whether the share of lawyers working in field-
specialized firms increases as well.  This provides evidence regarding whether law firms’ 
boundaries reflect only the distribution of individual clients’ demands, or reflect organizational 
trade-offs: whether firms or markets best mediate relationships between lawyers.  If 
organizational trade-offs are irrelevant, then firms' boundaries should be insensitive to the 
division of labor; thus, the share of lawyers working in field-specialized firms should not 
increase with market size, even if the share of lawyers that field-specialize does.  Finding instead 
that both the share of lawyers that field-specialize and the share of lawyers working in field-
specialized firms increases with market size is consistent with the hypothesis that organizational 
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trade-offs affect firms' boundaries.  To ensure that our estimates capture the effects of market 
size rather than differences in the composition of demand, this approach focuses only on small, 
relatively isolated geographic markets. 
  The second approach examines which types of specialists tend to work in the same firm 
and which tend not to do so.  Unlike the first approach, it provides no evidence on how firms’ 
boundaries change with the division of labor, since individuals’ fields are held constant.  But it 
provides more detailed evidence with respect to law firms’ field composition.  We use this 
evidence to examine various hypotheses regarding what drives organizational trade-offs with 
respect to firms’ boundaries: if law firms’ boundaries reflect Coasian organizational trade-offs, 
what is the nature of such trade-offs?  These hypotheses focus on the benefits and costs of 
revenue-sharing arrangements.  In particular, we consider the possibility that law firms’ field 
boundaries reflect variation in the value of knowledge-sharing, risk-sharing, and monitoring 
costs. 
Results from the first approach indicate that both the share of lawyers that field-specialize 
and the share of lawyers that work in field-specialized firms increase as market size increases.  
This is evidence that firms’ boundaries sometimes narrow as market size increases and 
individuals specialize.  It is inconsistent with the proposition that firms’ boundaries reflect only 
the distribution of clients’ demands, and consistent with the hypothesis that they are shaped by 
organizational trade-offs: whether firms or markets best mediate relationships between lawyers.  
We find that this relationship differs systematically across business-oriented fields according to 
whether clients primarily demand expertise in the process of structuring transactions (“ex ante” 
fields) or in the process of resolving disputes revolving around existing contractual relationships 
(“ex post” fields).  We do not find that firms’ boundaries narrow as individuals specialize in ex 
ante fields: as lawyers specialize more in ex ante fields such as corporate law, there is little 
evidence that relationships between them and lawyers in other fields are increasingly mediated 
by markets rather than firms.  In contrast, our evidence suggests that firms’ boundaries narrow as 
lawyers specialize in ex post fields: fields such as insurance law tend only to be covered in the 
same firm as other fields when insurance law and other fields are covered by the same lawyer.  
                                                                                                                                                             
1 In the U.S., the service sector's share of GDP (not including financial services) increased from 12% to 22% 
between 1970 and 2000; this sector is currently about 40% larger than manufacturing.  In contrast, manufacturing's 
share fell from 24% to 16% during this time.  See Economic Report of the President, February 2002, p. 336. 
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Our evidence from individual-oriented fields is similar to that from the ex post business fields: 
firms’ boundaries tend to narrow as lawyers specialize in fields such as criminal and domestic 
law.2 
Although our main results use data from only small, relatively isolated geographic 
markets, we also show that our results persist when we use our full sample, which includes large 
cities and suburbs in the analysis as well.  Furthermore, we show that the patterns we uncover are 
robust to controlling for differences in firm size. 
Results from our second approach indicate several patterns in law firms’ field scope.  We 
find that lawyers in ex ante fields that serve business demands tend to work at the same firm as 
lawyers in any of the ex ante business fields, and tend not to work at the same firm as lawyers in 
either ex post business fields or fields that serve individual demands.  For example, specialists in 
corporate law tend to work at the same firm as specialists in real estate law, but not specialists in 
insurance or criminal law.  There are two exceptions to this general pattern.  One is that patent 
lawyers generally do not work at the same firm as specialists in other ex ante business fields.  
The other is that probate lawyers, specialists who serve individual clients, tend to work at the 
same firm as ex ante business specialists.  For example, the scope of firms that have corporate or 
real estate specialists generally tends not to include patent law but does tend to include probate 
law, accounting for patent and probate lawyers’ share of the industry overall.  Finally, we find 
that lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with other lawyers in the same field than in 
any other field. 
This second set of results leads us to eliminate risk-sharing as an important determinant 
of firms’ field boundaries, and narrows the set of possible monitoring or knowledge sharing 
explanations.  Neither risk-sharing theories nor monitoring theories that emphasize fields’ 
cognitive closeness can explain why ex ante business fields tend to be found in the same firm.  
These fields have positively correlated demands, but some of them draw from substantively 
different bodies of the law.  In contrast, monitoring theories in which shared client knowledge 
lowers specialists’ costs of monitoring each other are consistent with these patterns, though they 
require additional elements to explain the split between ex ante and ex post business fields.  The 
                                                 
2 The result that law firms’ field boundaries tend to narrow as market size increases is related to Holmes’ (1999) 
finding that manufacturing firms’ vertical boundaries tend to narrow as market size increases.  Our paper differs 
sharply from Holmes’ in many ways, particularly in its emphasis on the specialization of individuals, organization-
theoretic trade-offs, and its analysis of firms’ horizontal rather than vertical boundaries. 
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same is true for theories where the benefits of organizing lawyers within a firm rest on 
facilitating the sharing of client-specific knowledge.  Finally, theories in which organizing 
lawyers within a firm facilitates referrals – the exchange of knowledge about economic 
opportunities – can explain most of the patterns that we uncover with respect to firms’ field 
scope.  They may also be consistent with the fact that specialists in the same field tend to work 
with each other, if lawyers “subspecialize” within fields or face time constraints, although this 
fact may have other explanations as well. 
Beyond deepening our knowledge of the role of firms in human capital intensive 
contexts, our findings help illuminate several other issues, traditionally addressed by different 
literatures. First, our findings on the horizontal scope of firms have bearing on the determination 
of industry structure, a key concern of the industrial organization literature.3 Second, an 
understanding of the effect of market size in the organization of work and the horizontal division 
of labor is key to the study of the sources of agglomeration effects in cities and their role in 
economic growth, a concern of the new urban economics literature.4 Third, our empirical 
evidence illuminates the grouping of task types into jobs and of jobs into firms in law firms and, 
as such, is of interest to the recent labor economics literature dealing with the problems of the 
breadth of task assignment and of job design.5 Finally, understanding the sources of the trade-
offs involved in the coordination of specialists is relevant to the growth literature that, building 
on Smith and Young (1928), investigates the determinants of specialization and the impact of 
specialization on economic growth.6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses Coasian and non-
Coasian views of firms’ boundaries, relates them to our context, and describes our general 
empirical approaches.  Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents results from our first 
empirical approach, which investigates whether and how firms’ boundaries change with the 
division of labor.  Section 5 presents and discusses results from our second empirical approach, 
which analyzes patterns in firms’ field composition.  Section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
3 Sutton (1991, 1998). 
4 See e.g. Glaeser et al (1992), Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, (2002). 
5 See e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom, (1991), Olsen and Torsvik, (2000). 
6 See e.g. Romer (1986, 1987). 
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2. Understanding the Boundaries of the Law Firm 
2.1. Law Firms and the Scope of Client Demands 
A prevailing view of the scope of law firms is that it is client-centered. Support for this 
view can be found in Heinz and Laumann’s (1982) study of the Chicago bar.7  This study, which 
is perhaps the leading sociological analysis of the organization of professional services, stresses 
how the type of client served shapes the organization of legal services. Heinz and Laumann 
conclude that the bar is divided in two “hemispheres” that correspond to client type: the 
corporate bar and the individual bar. Lawyers in these two hemispheres are so distinct in their 
training, practice, and socio-economic characteristics so as to be considered within different 
professions (1982:174). These authors conjecture that this division of the bar’s social structure is 
reflected by a sharp distinction between law firms that serve corporate and individual clients; 
those that serve corporate clients do not serve individual clients and vice-versa.  Within each of 
these “hemispheres,” and particularly in the corporate one, lawyers will tend to specialize, but 
the firm will “feel the pressure to serve a broad range of the demands of the firm’s clients” 
(1982:131).   
An analogous, demand-centric view of firms’ scope exists within the industrial 
organization literature as well.  This view posits that scope economies can be demand-based, 
derived from “one-stop-shopping” economies.  A precise modern statement of this view holds 
that in the presence of shopping costs8 multiproduct firms exist to “offer a variety of products at 
a single destination” (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997:472).9 The scope of the firm is then shaped by 
firms’ desire to capture externalities between product lines due to these shopping costs.  As 
applied to legal services, this view has implications that are similar to the sociological view 
depicted above: law firms’ scope should reflect only the scope of clients’ needs, and not 
problems associated with mediating relationships between lawyers. 
An implication of these demand-centric views is that firm scope should not change as 
market size increases if the composition of demand is held constant.  If firms’ scope simply 
                                                 
7 The study is based on hour long interviews with 777 Chicago lawyers. Being the first in-depth study of a 
profession, it is now considered a classic in sociology. 
8 Shopping costs are the real or perceived costs of using additional suppliers (Klemperer (1992)). 
9 Strategy researchers have also argued that offering demanders one-stop-shopping is a particular advantage of broad 
scope (e.g. Porter (1985)).  
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reflects the scope of individual clients’ demands, doubling market size by simply replicating the 
demands of existing clients should not affect firms’ scope, since replicating demands does not 
alter the scope-distribution of clients’ demands. 
2.2. Organizational Trade-offs and Law Firm Boundaries 
Since Coase (1937), economists have viewed firms and markets as alternative 
institutional structures through which economic activity is coordinated.  Whether firms or 
markets efficiently mediate the division of labor, and thus best promote specialization, depends 
on which structure minimizes transaction costs.  Modern theories of organization have since built 
from Coase by proposing what differentiates transacting within versus between firms, then 
analyzing the trade-offs associated with using firms and markets.  While the details of these 
theories differ, they share the Coasian view that firms’ boundaries reflect organizational trade-
offs; in this context, that they reflect whether relationships between lawyers are best mediated 
within firms or by markets.  What distinguishes this view from the demand-centric views above 
is that it emphasizes that firms’ boundaries are determined not by demand patterns (e.g., whether 
clients find expertise in different fields complementary), but by how relationships between 
suppliers are best organized. 
The Coasian logic suggests a natural way for investigating whether organizational trade-
offs affect firms’ boundaries: examine whether firms’ boundaries narrow as market size 
increases and individuals become more specialized.  We depict this in Figure 1.  Suppose one 
can partition knowledge into fields of expertise.  The dashed lines depict the scope of 
individuals’ expertise, and the solid lines depict how individuals are grouped into firms.  In the 
Figure, one individual covers both field A and other fields in small markets but different 
individuals cover field A and other fields in large markets.  As market size increases, individuals 
specialize in field A. 
When a single individual covers both field A and other fields, the scope of his or her firm 
includes field A and other fields.  Organizational trade-offs, which appear only when different 
individuals cover field A and other fields, do not affect whether the firm’s scope includes field A 
and other fields.  Firms’ scope tends to be broad because individuals cover multiple fields.  But 
once individuals specialize, firms’ scope depends not just on the range of individuals’ expertise, 
but also on whether firms or markets mediate the division of labor efficiently.  When firms do, 
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firms’ boundaries should not change as individuals specialize.  When markets do, firms’ 
boundaries should narrow.  In the Figure, if markets efficiently mediate relationships between 
individuals in field A and other fields, then firms’ scope should include field A and other fields 
only when these fields are covered by the same individual. 
One can therefore test whether organizational trade-offs affect firms’ boundaries by 
examining whether firms’ boundaries change with increases in the size of demand, holding 
constant the distribution of demands.  If organizational trade-offs associated with the division of 
labor do not affect firms’ boundaries, then firms’ boundaries should not narrow as market size 
increases and individuals specialize.  This is the case when, as depicted in the previous 
subsection, firms’ boundaries merely mirror the distribution of demands of individual 
demanders.  Finding instead that firms’ boundaries narrow as individuals specialize is therefore 
evidence that organizational trade-offs associated with the division of labor affect firms’ 
boundaries.10 
2.3  Law Firms’ Boundaries: The Benefits and Costs of Ex Ante Revenue Sharing 
Arrangements 
Regardless of their legal form of organization, law firms in the U.S. are always structured 
around “ex ante” revenue-sharing arrangements among the firm’s partners, i.e. arrangements that 
are in place before individuals obtain information about specific economic opportunities, and 
have the feature that all individuals receive some share of revenues from the services any of them 
supply (although the share the involved individuals receive may be higher).  Firms’ horizontal 
scope reflects the fields that partners cover.  From the perspective of the partnership, whether a 
field is covered by the firm is equivalent to whether an individual with expertise in the field is 
included in the revenue-sharing arrangement.  Thus, when discussing the organizational trade-
offs with respect to law firms’ scope, we emphasize the benefits and costs associated with ex 
ante revenue-sharing arrangements.11 
                                                 
10 The idea that firms’ boundaries may narrow as market size increases is not new to industrial organization.  It is an 
implication in Stigler (1951) and was studied recently by Holmes (1999).  The Coasian logic discussed here is not 
part of Stigler’s or Holmes’ analysis. 
11 We focus on issues that bear on revenue sharing arrangements’ effect on firm scope.  Revenue sharing 
arrangements may have other roles as well, such as encouraging the hiring of high-ability individuals (Levin and 
Tadelis (2002)).  Similarly to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and Holmstrom (1999), our account emphasizes how 
firms can outperform markets by weakening individual incentives.  Because the trade-offs we investigate are 
different, so are our predicted relationships between specialization (job design) and optimal organizational form.  
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The production of legal services also involves the use of other resources such as office 
space, office equipment, libraries, or secretaries.  Although scale economies exist with respect to 
these resources, it is common, though perhaps not costless, for them to be shared across lawyers 
in different firms when these resources would be otherwise underutilized.12  This feature of the 
industry suggests that law firms’ boundaries are shaped primarily by contractual trade-offs rather 
than technological trade-offs, consistent with the view taken by the economics of organization 
literature.  Our analysis will thus focus on contractual issues rather than scale or scope 
economies associated with inputs other than lawyers’ human capital.  Nonetheless, we will show 
that our main results are robust to controlling for firm size (i.e., the number of lawyers), 
indicating that they are not driven by scale-related effects. 
 
a. Knowledge Sharing  
An important problem created by specialization is the need for individuals with different 
expertise to share knowledge.  This knowledge could be about the existence of economic 
opportunities or it could concern expertise relevant to addressing a client’s legal problem. 
Consider first the problem of sharing knowledge about the existence of an opportunity 
between lawyers with different expertise. A lawyer who knows that a particular client has a legal 
problem may conclude that she herself has a comparative advantage in addressing this problem 
or, alternatively, she may determine that some other lawyer is better qualified to deal with the 
problem. In the latter case, she must refer it to another lawyer, potentially losing the rents that 
could be derived from serving the client herself. 
This problem was studied by Garicano and Santos (2003). They note that information 
asymmetries favor those who have private information about opportunities, regardless of whether 
firms or markets mediate relationships between individuals.  Giving away this information is 
equivalent to giving up rents. As a result, referrals take place under some incomplete 
information, with an informational asymmetry that favors the referrer. In this context, ex ante 
                                                                                                                                                             
We do not address other incentive problems, such as those deriving from the risk of expropriation of specific 
investments (Klein, et al. (1978)) or to the role of physical assets in providing incentives in the presence of 
incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), which may be more important in other 
environments. 
12 Results from the Heinz and Nelson survey described below report that most sole practitioners share office space, 
copying machines, libraries, and other fixed inputs with lawyers in other firms. 
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revenue sharing arrangements facilitate the exchange of referrals.  When firms mediate 
relationships between individuals, individuals share revenues regardless of who supplies the 
service.  In contrast, when markets mediate such relationships, individuals with private 
knowledge about an opportunity only share revenues with others if a referral actually takes 
place.13  Individuals' incentives to hold on to problems that others have a comparative advantage 
in solving are weaker when firms mediate relationships than markets, because they share 
revenues even when no referral takes place.   
Ex ante revenue sharing arrangements effectively tax individuals when they hold on to 
opportunities themselves, thus weakening their incentives to hold on to opportunities for which 
they are not best qualified to serve.  Thus, one benefit of partnership-like arrangements – the 
benefit of transacting “within a firm” – is that they improve the efficiency of the exchange of 
referrals relative to alternative organizational structures.   
A similar logic implies that ex ante revenue-sharing arrangements also facilitate the 
exchange of substantive knowledge among specialists, such as legal expertise or knowledge 
about clients. Again, incentive problems can arise from the exchange of knowledge because 
when lawyers share knowledge with one another, they reduce their future value to clients relative 
to those with whom they share it. Revenue sharing arrangements facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge for two reasons.  First, the receiver of knowledge shares with the transmitter a share 
of his future revenues, so that the sender benefits in the future from the more extensive 
knowledge of the receiver. Second, the sender shares with the receiver his present and future 
revenues, thus diminishing the extent to which he appropriates returns from his own use of this 
knowledge.  Revenue sharing arrangements increase the extent to which the sender benefits 
when others use his knowledge relative when he uses it himself. 
It follows that lawyers should be more likely to work within the same versus different 
firms, the more valuable knowledge sharing – referrals or collaboration -- is.  Thus, lawyers in 
fields across which knowledge-sharing is valuable should be more likely to be found within the 
same firm than those in fields across which knowledge-sharing is less valuable. 
b. Risk Sharing 
                                                 
13 Lawyers in different firms are generally allowed to compensate each other for referrals as long as the terms are 
disclosed to clients. This is unlike the medical profession, in which compensation for referrals is (nominally) 
prohibited. 
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An alternative view of the benefits of revenue-sharing arrangements is that they facilitate 
risk sharing among specialists.  This is proposed by Gilson and Mnookin (1985).  In this view, 
revenue sharing arrangements insure lawyers against fluctuations in demand for their expertise.  
It follows that such arrangements would be particularly valuable for lawyers in fields where 
demands are negatively correlated, and least valuable for lawyers in fields where demands are 
highly positively correlated. 
c. Free Riding and Monitoring   
The general drawback to revenue-sharing arrangements, the drawback to transacting 
within firms in this context, is that free-rider problems emerge.  Individuals do not appropriate 
the full value of their efforts under such arrangements, and this weakens effort incentives.  
(Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmstrom (1982))  Revenue-sharing arrangements could weaken 
lawyers’ incentives to do high-quality work.  The agency costs associated with such 
arrangements are one reason firms’ boundaries might narrow as market size increases and 
individuals specialize. 
Partnerships have other incentive instruments in addition to revenue-sharing 
arrangements, such as bonuses.  If used effectively, these instruments can mitigate free-rider 
problems to some extent, and thus decrease the cost of transacting within firms.  Using these 
effectively, however, requires that lawyers be able to assess each others’ output.  Because of this, 
all of these incentive instruments tend to become less useful as specialization increases, since 
agents’ expertise overlaps less.  As lawyers become more specialized, the cost of transacting 
within firms tends to increase.  This would be particularly the case when different lawyers 
specialize in fields where the fundamental legal doctrines have little overlap if this makes it  
difficult for them to assess each others’ work.  An implication is that, other things being equal, 
lawyers in fields with strong cognitive connections should be more likely to work in the same 
firm than those with weak connections, since the monitoring cost of transacting within firms is 
lower.  
2.4. Empirical Strategy and Implications 
We provide empirical evidence with respect to whether these sources of variation affect 
firms’ boundaries in two ways.  One extends the exercise described above: we analyze how 
firms’ boundaries narrow as market size increases and individuals become more specialized.  
Specifically, we determine which fields tend to be covered in the same firm as other fields only 
   12
when they are covered by the same individual – that is, for which specialties the pattern looks 
like the top rather than the bottom in Figure 1.  Once individuals specialize in these fields, they 
tend to work in field-specialized firms.  Relationships between them and specialists in other 
fields tend to be mediated by markets, not firms.  The other approach simply assesses which 
pairs of specialists tend to work in the same firm with one another versus not.  Unlike the 
approach described above, this holds individuals’ fields constant, and thus provides no evidence 
on whether changes in the division of labor are associated with changes in firms’ boundaries.  
But it provides additional evidence with respect to the scope of non-specialized firms.  Returning 
to Figure 1, while the first approach could detect whether specialists in field A work in the same 
firm as specialists in other fields, it could not detect which other fields.  Evidence on which 
specialists work at the same firm as individuals in field A and which do not sheds some light on 
whether firms’ scope corresponds to variation in the value of knowledge sharing, risk sharing, 
and monitoring costs. 
This evidence will narrow the set of possible organization-theoretic explanations of law 
firms’ field boundaries.  If firms’ boundaries are primarily driven by risk-sharing benefits, one 
would expect fields that differ sharply in their client base to be more likely to be found within the 
same firm than fields with similar client bases.  In fact, we will find the opposite.  We will also 
be able to distinguish among various explanations in which  firms’ scope is driven by knowledge 
sharing or monitoring cost considerations.  In particular, we will use evidence from Heinz, et al 
(1998) on patterns of “co-practice” by individual lawyers – which combinations of fields lawyers 
cover – as an indicator of fields’ cognitive connections.  We then compare this evidence to ours.  
We will find several cases in which specialists who work in fields that do not have strong 
cognitive connections nevertheless are likely to work in the same firm, and interpret this as 
evidence against monitoring-based theories that revolve around fields’ cognitive connections.  
We will then discuss other monitoring-based and knowledge sharing explanations, and describe 
the conditions under which they could explain the important patterns in our data.  Distinguishing 
definitively among these remaining explanations probably requires direct evidence on 
monitoring, knowledge-sharing, and referral patterns across lawyers in different fields, evidence 
that our data do not provide. 
 
3. Data 
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 The data are from the legal services portion of the 1992 Census of Services.  Like in other 
industries, the Census surveys individual establishments in this industry.  Forms are sent to all 
law offices that surpass a size threshold (approximately ten employees) or that are part of multi-
establishment firms.  In addition, forms are sent to a random sample of smaller offices, where the 
sampling rate is set to obtain reliable MSA- and national-level estimates.  In all, the Census 
sends survey forms to law offices that account for approximately 80% of revenues in the 
industry.  Details are in Bureau of the Census (1996).  The Census publishes MSA-level 
estimates derived from this survey in Bureau of the Census (1996).  In this paper, we use 
establishment-level data, which are not publicly available.   
 Along with standard questions regarding revenues, payroll, and employment, the survey 
asks law offices industry-specific questions that provide detailed information about the  
distribution of lawyers across fields of the law.  (See Appendix 1.)  It asks respondents to 
classify the lawyers that work in the office by their primary field and report how many are in 
each category: how many lawyers at the establishment specialize in corporate law, for example.  
When lawyers work in multiple fields, they are classified as “general practitioners.”  The survey 
thus provides unusually detailed information about organization and specialization at the 
establishment level.  We use data from 1992 because it is the most recent year for which the 
Census asks about lawyers’ fields. 
 In all, the Census received responses to these organizational questions from about 28,000 
law offices.  We omit from our sample law offices with inconsistent responses for the total 
number of lawyers; for example, those where the number of lawyers summed across fields does 
not equal the number of partners plus the number of associates.  Omitting these offices, our “full 
sample” includes 26,151 law offices and 219,033 lawyers.  These constitute about 17% of law 
offices and 50% of privately-practicing lawyers in the United States in 1992. 
 Table 1 contains some summary statistics.  The average law office has 3.56 lawyers, and 
the average firm has 3.65 lawyers, a reminder that the average law firm in the U.S. is a very 
small, single-establishment enterprise.  71% of the lawyers in our sample are reported to 
specialize in one of the Census-defined fields.  37% of law offices and 28% of firms are 
specialized, in the sense that all lawyers in the office or firm specialize in the same field.  28% of 
lawyers work in multiestablishment firms, but only 5% of offices are part of multiestablishment 
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firms.  Although only 2% of the law firms in our sample have multiple locations, those that do 
are much larger than most single establishment firms. 
 Table 2 provides a more detailed look at specialization patterns.  We report these patterns 
for each of the Census-defined fields.  To facilitate analysis both here and below, we present 
patterns for groups of fields that differ in the source and timing of demands.  “Individual fields” 
are those where all or nearly all demand comes from individuals; in our data, these include 
criminal, domestic relations, negligence-plaintiff, and probate.  We label the rest of the fields, 
fields where a substantial part of demand comes from businesses, as “business fields.”  Within 
these groups, fields differ according to the timing of demands.  We propose that demand for legal 
services can arise either before a contractual arrangement is agreed upon, when lawyers may be 
involved in drafting agreements and predicting the contingencies that agreements should address, 
or after contractual terms are agreed upon and take force, when lawyers may be involved in 
dispute resolution and litigation.  We label these “ex ante” and “ex post” fields respectively.  
Among the business fields, we classify insurance and negligence-defendant as ex post fields, and 
the rest as ex ante fields.  Expertise in insurance law is generally demanded to assess insurance 
claims or provide defense for parties covered by insurance.  (Abrams (2000))  Expertise in 
negligence is demanded by defendants in tort-related matters.  Among individual fields, we 
classify probate as ex ante and the rest as ex post.14 
 Survey data confirms these cross-field differences in the source and timing of demands.  
Table 3 reports results from an extensive interview-based survey (“Chicago Lawyers II”) of 
Chicago lawyers completed in 1995 by Jack Heinz and Bob Nelson of the American Bar 
Foundation.15  Questions in this survey ask privately-practicing lawyers what share of their time 
they spend on business, non-business organizational (e.g., governmental), and individual clients, 
and how many days per month they spend in state and Federal court.  Days per month in court is 
a good indicator for the degree to which lawyers provide “ex ante” or “ex post” services.  We 
                                                 
14 We report these together in Table 2 because there is only one ex ante individual field. 
15 These data were collected as a follow-up project to Heinz and Laumann (1982).  Heinz and Nelson surveyed a 
random sample of Chicago-based lawyers taken from the State of Illinois’ lawyer registration records.  They 
collected the data by conducting one-hour interviews with subjects at their offices.  In all, 788 lawyers from this 
random sample were interviewed, 526 of whom were in private practice.  See Heinz, et. al. (1998) for more details.  
We are extremely grateful to Jack Heinz and Bob Nelson for sharing their data. 
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report the average response for fields that closely match those defined in the Census data.16  The 
table indicates a sharp break in the share of time lawyers in different fields spend on business 
clients.  Specialists in personal injury (on the plaintiff’s side of the bar), criminal, divorce, and 
probate law spend almost all of their time on individual clients.  The rest (except specialists in 
municipal law, which predominantly have governmental clients) spend the majority of their time 
on business clients.  Likewise, personal injury, criminal, and divorce specialists spend more days 
in court than lawyers in any of the other specialties, consistent with the idea that demands for 
expertise in these fields tend to be more “ex post” than other fields.  Although the number of 
observations is very low, probate specialists appear to spend less time in court than other 
specialists that serve individual clients, reflecting that the demand they face tends to be more for 
“ex ante” services. 
 The first column of Table 2 reports the share of lawyers in each of the Census fields and  
groups of fields.  27% of lawyers specialize in an "ex ante" business field; about a third of these 
are corporate law specialists.  13% specialize in an "ex post" business field.  15% specialize in an 
individual field; about half of these are classified as "negligence-plaintiff."  The second and third 
columns report the share of lawyers working in specialized offices and firms, by field.  These 
figures are very similar because individual offices within large multi-establishment firms are 
generally not specialized by field: if a multi-establishment firm contains lawyers in different 
specialties, its offices usually do as well.  The final column reports the fraction of specialists that 
work in specialized firms, by field.  The notable pattern here is that, with the exception of patent 
lawyers, ex ante business specialists are less prone to work in a specialized firm than ex post 
business or individual specialists.  Over a third of ex post specialists and nearly half of individual 
specialists work at specialized firms, but less than 20% of ex ante specialists do.  The lowest 
fraction among the fields is for corporate law: only 5% of corporate law specialists work at firms 
with only corporate law specialists. 
                                                 
16 Even these do not always match perfectly.  For example, the Chicago Lawyers II survey does not include a 
separate category for “insurance law,” but the Census data does.  Jack Heinz reported to us that he believes that most 
of those reporting “insurance law” to the Census would classify themselves in the Chicago Lawyers II survey as 
“personal injury-defendant.”  Fifteen lawyers in the Chicago Lawyers II report themselves to be specialists in 
“securities;” these lawyers would probably be classified as “corporate” in the Census data.  These lawyers’ 
responses to the time allocation and days in court questions are very similar to the “general corporate” lawyers 
reported in Table 1. 
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 Table 2 thus provides some initial evidence regarding firms’ scope.  This evidence, 
however, does not indicate that firms’ boundaries are sensitive to the division of labor: the fact 
that ex post business and individual specialists are more likely to work in field specialized firms 
than most ex ante business specialists may just reflect differences in the scope of clients’ 
demands.  Furthermore, it provides no evidence on the scope of non-specialized firms: with 
which other lawyers do lawyers in ex ante business specialties work?  Sections 4 and 5, which 
present the main empirical analysis in the paper, provide evidence on these fronts. 
 
The Size and Distribution of Demand 
 In Section 4, we examine whether firms’ boundaries change with increases in the size of 
demand, holding constant the distribution of demands: the exercise that corresponds to Figure 1.  
We merged our office-level Census data with data from 1992 County Business Patterns to obtain 
controls for cross-sectional differences in the distribution of demand.  County Business Patterns 
(CBP) provides county-level information regarding the distribution of employment across 
industries and the employment size distribution of establishments.  We compute employment 
shares for each of seven major (one-digit) industries (e.g., manufacturing) for each county; 
although information is available for more detailed industry definitions for many counties, the 
Census withholds more detailed data in many cases because of confidentiality-related 
restrictions.17  We also compute the share of establishments within various employment size 
categories in the county, and an estimate of employees per establishment by major sector.  We 
derive the latter by multiplying the size category shares by the midpoints of the employment size 
categories. 
 The CBP data provide information about the distribution and size of local demand for 
legal services.  The employment shares characterize the local economy, and depict the extent to 
which local demand for legal services comes from different classes of firms: manufacturing 
versus financial services, for example.  They also depict whether local demanders are small or 
large firms overall and within sectors.  For example, counties where the average establishment 
size in financial services is large contain the country’s most important financial districts.  If the 
employment shares capture differences in the distribution of local demand well, one can think of 
                                                 
17 We have run specifications with two-digit controls, using imputations for county-sectors for which the Census 
does not report figures.  None of the results differ from those reported below, that use one-digit controls. 
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increases in total employment, conditional on these shares, as rotations in the demand curve for 
legal services: proportionate increases in the various legal problems encountered by individuals 
and businesses located in the county.18 
 An important concern in our empirical work is that variation in county-level employment, 
conditional on our controls, captures differences in the size and not the distribution of demands 
faced by lawyers based in the county.  This condition seems a priori more plausible in some 
contexts than others.  It may be reasonable when comparing relatively small, isolated counties: to 
a first approximation, the demand for legal services in Lubbock, TX, which is about twice as 
large as Abilene, TX in terms of employment, may be simply two times that in Abilene.  But 
agglomeration economies may mean that the demand faced by lawyers in very large cities is not 
just a “scaling up” of those faced by lawyers in very small cities; businesses may choose to 
locate in very large cities precisely because they require special services that are only available 
in such cities.  Holding constant the employment shares described above, the demand faced by 
lawyers in Houston may not be simply 18 times that in Lubbock.  Furthermore, the distribution 
of demands addressed by lawyers based in similarly-sized suburban and non-suburban counties 
may differ, if suburban clients are served by lawyers who are based in nearby cities. 
 We address this concern by basing this empirical exercise on a part of our sample where 
problems associated with agglomeration economies and market definition are relatively small: 
counties that are either part of single-county Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined by 
the United States Census or that are not part of MSAs.19 The Census combines counties into a 
single MSA on the basis of their degree of economic and social integration.  Restricting the 
analysis to counties that fit the above criterion eliminates all counties that are economically 
integrated with other, neighboring counties; it excludes all suburban counties and all but four of 
the 50 largest MSAs in the United States.20  These four single-county MSAs – Honolulu, Las 
Vegas, San Diego, and Phoenix – are much larger than the rest of the single-county MSAs; we 
                                                 
18 Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use rotations in the demand curve to identify relationships between competitive 
conduct and entry in concentrated markets.  The main issues in this paper – the specialization of individuals and 
firms’ scope – play no role in their analysis.  See also Campbell and Hopenhayn (2003). 
19 The Census defines an MSA as “a core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent 
communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core.”   To qualify as an MSA, an 
area must have at least 50,000 population.  
20 The Census combines two counties into the same MSA if at least 15% of inhabitants of one commute to the other 
counties or at least 15% of employees in one commute from the other. 
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exclude these as well.21 A full list of the MSAs in our “small market subsample” is in Appendix 
2.  The counties in this subsample all relatively small and have a low level of economic 
integration with other counties.  The largest of these is Tucson, AZ, which has 212,068 
employees.   
 We examine the degree to which this sample restriction and our controls hold constant 
the field distribution of demands by exploiting an additional variable in our data.  The Census 
asks offices to report the distribution of revenues by client type: what share of revenues come 
from individual clients, business clients, and government clients?  We regress the share that 
comes from individual clients on county employment and our controls, weighting each office by 
the number of lawyers that work there.  Finding that this fraction decreases with county 
employment would imply that our controls do not completely soak up market size-related 
differences in the distribution of demands: lawyers in larger markets handle disproportionately 
business and government demands.  In contrast, finding no relationship between the “individual 
client share” and county employment would indicate that the distribution of revenues across 
clients stay constant with market size, thus lending support to the assumption that, conditional on 
our controls, the field distribution of demands more generally does not vary with county-level 
employment. 
 Table 4 contains the results from this exercise.  The first three columns use the small 
market subsample.  The first of these columns report coefficients from regressions that contain 
only a set of market size dummies and no controls.  The coefficients on these indicate that the 
individual client share tends to fall with market size, even within the small market subsample.  
The second column includes our set of controls.  All of the coefficients are small and none are 
statistically significantly different from zero.  The fact that the coefficients decrease between the 
second and first column provides evidence that the controls pick up differences in the 
distribution of demands for legal services.  The fact that the coefficients on the market size 
dummies are no longer statistically significant implies that, conditional on these controls, there is 
no evidence that the distribution of demands varies with county employment within this 
                                                 
21 There are two natural breaks in the employment size distribution of single-county MSAs.  The four MSAs listed 
here all have more than 335,000 employees.  There are no such counties with between 215,000 and 335,000 
employees. There are then six (Albuquerque, NM; El Paso, TX; Fresno, CA; Lancaster, PA; Madison, WI; and 
Tucson, AZ) with between 170,000 and 215,000 employees, then none again with between 145,000 (Flint, MI) and 
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subsample.  The third replaces the market size dummies with ln(county employment); the 
coefficient on this variable is once again not statistically significantly different from zero.  
Looking only at our small market subsample, we find no evidence of a relationship between the 
individual client share and county employment once our controls are added, lending support to 
the assumption that the size, but not the distribution, of demands varies with employment when 
looking across these counties once we include these controls. 
 The other three columns repeat this exercise using the full sample.  These results indicate 
a relationship between the individual share and employment that persists even after including the 
controls, particularly when comparing very large with smaller markets.  This indicates that the 
distribution of demands varies with employment when using the full sample.  This evidence 
shapes how we present and interpret the evidence from our first approach.  While we will show 
that the patterns that we uncover within the small market subsample also appear when using the 
full sample, we will base inferences from our first approach on results from the small market 
subsample. 
 
Other Issues 
 Several notable empirical issues remain, even when restricting the analysis to the small 
market subsample.  One concerns market definition for lawyers working in multi-office firms.  If 
lawyers in multi-office firms serve clients based in all of the regions in which their firm is 
located, using employment in the county in which the lawyer is based as a measure of market 
size understates the actual market the lawyer potentially serves, and could bias our estimates of 
relationships between specialization and market size.  While this issue would appear to be 
relatively minor with respect to our small market subsample – only 10% of lawyers in this 
sample work at multi-office firms, and very few of the nation’s largest law firms have offices in 
these counties – we investigated it nonetheless.  Following the approach described in a working 
paper version of this paper (Garicano and Hubbard (2003b)), we allowed market size to be a 
function of employment in all of the counties a lawyer’s firm has an office rather than just the 
county in which the office is located.  There is no difference in our results when we do so.  This 
is not a surprise, since the working paper version of this paper had shown that accounting for this 
                                                                                                                                                             
170,000 employees.  The results reported below include the six counties with between 170,000 and 215,000 
employees; they are virtually the same when excluding these six counties. 
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had little effect on the results when using our full sample – a sample that includes big-city law 
firms with sizeable networks of offices. 
 A second issue is that individuals as well as businesses demand legal services, and 
employment-based measures may not capture the size and distribution of individual demand 
well.  Better measures of individual demand would be population- rather than employment-
based, and demographic variables might capture certain demands well (for example, the demand 
for probate work should be higher in regions with many elderly residents).  We have run 
specifications that use such controls.  While some of the controls do help explain cross-market 
differences in specialization patterns, none of our results of interest – which concern 
relationships between specialization and market size – change when including these additional 
controls.22 
 Finally, a third issue is whether our results persist when controlling for firm size.    While 
this exercise is of empirical interest, it has an uneasy relationship with the organization-theoretic 
view we describe above.  In this view, lawyers, not firms, are the units of production.  Firms are 
viewed as one possible institution through which relationships among lawyers are governed.  
Firm size (e.g., the number of lawyers in the firm) is an outcome of organizational trade-offs, and 
all scale and scope economies are contractual in nature.  In this light, firm size is not something 
to control for; rather, since firms’ size in part reflects their scope, it is something that our 
analysis illuminates. 
 This is not the only possible view of firms, however.  In neoclassical theory, firms are the 
unit of production, and some scale and scope economies (or diseconomies) are defined at the 
firm level. 
 Suppose that firm-level scale and scope economies are intertwined, so that it is only 
efficient for firms to be field-specialized if their scale is sufficiently high.  For example, suppose 
it is inefficient for a two-lawyer firm to be field-specialized but more efficient for a seven-lawyer 
firm to be.  Then if firms tend to be larger in larger markets, they would also be more field-
specialized as well, but for reasons that need not have to do with Coasian organizational trade-
offs. 
                                                 
22 We do not report these results here because they are very similar to those reported below, and releasing results 
from multiple, closely related specifications can raise disclosure issues for the Bureau of the Census. 
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 We investigate this by examining whether the relationships we uncover between market 
size and the share of lawyers working in field-specialized firms persist when controlling for the 
number of lawyers in the office.  If law firms’ scope tends to narrow with market size only 
because of firm size effects, there should be no relationship between the share of lawyers 
working in field-specialized firms and market size once one controls for firm size.  As we show 
later, we do not find this to be the case: if anything, relationships between the share of lawyers 
who work in field-specialized firms and market size become stronger once we control for the 
number of lawyers in the firm.   
 
4. Market Size, Specialization, and Organization 
 4.1 Empirical Framework 
 The first step in our empirical work examines relationships between market size and the 
probability that lawyers specialize in one of the Census-defined fields.  Our basic empirical 
framework for examining relationships between market size and individual specialization is 
simple.  Let the probability that lawyer i in market j is a specialist of some sort be pi, where: 
1( )i jp f X β=  
Xj is a vector of observable characteristics of local market j and β1 is a parameter vector.  The 
coefficient on our proxy for local market size, county employment, will be of particular interest.  
We interpret variation in this variable, conditional on our controls for the distribution of local 
demand, as proportionate differences in the demand for the spectrum of services lawyers 
provide. 
 Our data are at the level of the law office rather than the lawyer.  We thus estimate β1  
using the expression: 
1( )k js f X β=  
where sk is the share of lawyers in law office k that are specialists of some sort, weighting each 
observation by the number of lawyers working at the law office.  To make interpreting the 
coefficient estimates simple, we assume that f is linear, so: 
1 1k j ks X β ε= +  
   22
This produces a grouped data analog to the linear probability model; β1 can thus be interpreted as 
a probability derivative.  It captures reduced-form relationships between specialization shares 
and market characteristics. 
 We estimate analogous specifications for particular fields and for groups of fields.  
These, for example, relate market size and composition to the share of lawyers who specialize in 
corporate law, or in any one of the ex ante business fields. 
 The second step in our empirical approach estimates specifications that relate the 
probability that an individual works at a field-specialized law firm to market characteristics.23  
Let pisf denote the probability that an individual is a specialist and works at a field-specialized 
firm.24  We specify: 
2( )
sf
i jp f X β=  
As before, because the unit of observation is the law office rather than individual, we estimate 
specifications based on the equation: 
2 2 2( )
sf
k j j ks f X Xβ β ε= = +  
where sksf is the share of lawyers at office k who are in a specialized firm and we weight 
observations by the number of lawyers.  Note that sksf = 0 if lawyers at office k do not share the 
same field as all other lawyers in their firm and sksf = 1 if they do; this is a discrete dependent 
variable model.  As above, we estimate analogous specifications for individual fields and groups 
of fields. 
Combined, β1 and β2 depict how much individual specialization increases with market 
size, and whether increases in the division of labor across individuals take place within or 
between law firms.  They thus provide evidence regarding whether firms’ scope merely reflects 
the scope of individual clients’ demands.  If β1 > 0 and β2 = 0, this indicates that although 
individuals specialize more as market size increases, the share of individuals working in field-
specialized firms does not.  This pattern corresponds to the upper arrow in Figure 1, in which 
firms’ boundaries do not narrow as market size increases and individuals specialize.  In contrast, 
if β1 > 0 and β2 > 0, this indicates that both the share of individuals who specialize and the share 
                                                 
23 Very few lawyers work in field-specialized offices that are part of non-specialized multi-office firms.  Thus, our 
results and conclusions would be exactly the same if we analyzed relationships between market size and the 
specialization of law offices rather than firms. 
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of individuals who work in field-specialized firms increase with market size.  This would 
indicate that sometimes the pattern corresponds to the lower arrow in Figure 1, in which firms’ 
boundaries narrow as market size increases and individuals specialize.  When β1 > 0, β2/β1 
reflects the degree to which increases in the division of labor are mediated by markets.  Finding 
such a pattern is therefore evidence against the hypothesis that law firms’ boundaries reflect only 
the distribution of clients’ demands.  It would indicate that firms’ boundaries sometimes change 
with the division of labor, consistent with the view that organizational trade-offs – whether firms 
or markets best mediate relationships between lawyers – influence law firms’ scope.25 
  
4.2 Market Size and Lawyer Specialization 
 Table 5 contains results regarding individual specialization and market size using our 
small market subsample.  It presents estimates from eight regressions.  In the first column, the 
dependent variable is sk, the share of lawyers at law office k who are specialized in one of the 
fields described above.  In the top panel, there are no control variables.  β1, the coefficient on 
ln(county employment), is positive and significant: the share of lawyers who field-specialize is 
greater in larger markets.  The point estimate of 0.137 indicates that doubling county 
employment is associated with a 9.5 percentage point increase in the predicted share of 
specialists.  The bottom panel contains results when including our full set of controls.  The 
estimate of β1 hardly changes.  While none of the coefficient estimates on the controls are 
individually significantly different from zero, one can reject the null hypothesis that they are 
jointly different from zero using an F-test with size 0.05. 
 The other three columns present results from analogous specifications, where the 
dependent variable is the share of individuals that specialize in ex ante business fields, ex post 
business fields, and individual fields, respectively.  Looking at the bottom panel, each of the 
estimates of β1 is positive and significant; lawyers specialize more in larger markets within each 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Our results are unchanged if we define a specialized firm as one where most of the lawyers (rather than all) share 
the same specialty, for example as one where 75% or 90% do. 
25 The ratio β2/β1 is an instrumental variables estimate of the effect of lawyer specialization on law firm 
specialization if county employment is a valid instrument for lawyer specialization.  This can be seen by writing the 
ratio as: 2 1/ [ / (ln( ))] /[ / (ln( ))] /
sf sf
k k k ks county employment s county employment s sβ β = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ . This identification 
strategy requires that market size be related to firms' boundaries only through its effect on lawyers' specialization 
decisions.  In Garicano and Hubbard (2003a), we discuss why this assumption is plausible in human capital 
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of these groups of fields.  Note that these estimates differ from those in the upper panel; the 
business field coefficients are lower and the individual field coefficient is greater.  This is as 
expected in light of Table 3, which showed that part of the simple relationship between the 
individual client share and county employment reflected differences in the distribution of 
demands that are picked up by the controls.  Some of the coefficients on the controls are 
statistically different from zero.  As one would expect, the share of lawyers specializing in an ex 
ante business fields is greater in counties with larger financial services sectors, and the share 
specializing in individual segments is greater in counties with larger retail (and thus smaller 
production-related) sectors.   
Table 6 reports results from 13 additional regressions where the dependent variables are 
the share of lawyers that specialize in each of the fields in our data.  The estimates of β1 are 
positive for each of the fields in our sample, and significantly greater than zero for six of the 
fields.   Assuming that changes in our market size measure alter the size but not the distribution 
of demand for legal services, fields for which the coefficients are positive – corporate, 
environmental, tax, insurance, criminal, and negligence-plaintiff (and perhaps also real estate and 
probate, both of which are close to being statistically greater than zero) -- are those that tend to 
be covered by "general practitioners" in very small markets but specialists in larger ones. 
 In sum, our evidence on lawyer specialization is that lawyers specialize more as market 
size increases.  These increases in specialization with market size reflect that small market 
lawyers supply services that usually cross field boundaries, but this becomes less and less true as 
market size increases.  The next section examines whether firms’ field boundaries change as 
well.  In fields in which lawyer specialization increases with market size, this will indicate the 
degree to which increases in the division of labor take place within or between firms, and thus 
provide evidence whether organizational trade-offs affect firms’ boundaries. 
 
4.3  Market Size and the Division of Labor Within and Between Firms 
 The first row of Table 7 contains results from regressions that are analogous to those in 
the bottom panel of Table 5, but use sksf rather than sk as the dependent variable.  These 
regressions relate the share of lawyers working in field-specialized law firms to market size and 
                                                                                                                                                             
intensive contexts in light of recent organizational theory.  We do not emphasize causal interpretations of β2/β1 in 
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composition.  These relationships are of particular interest for fields in which individual lawyers 
specialize more with market size.  Finding that lawyers become more specialized and work more 
in field-specialized firms as market size increases indicates circumstances where organizational 
trade-offs influence firms’ boundaries; in these cases, the division of labor tends to be mediated 
between rather than within firms. 
 In the first column, the dependent variable is the share of lawyers who work in a field-
specialized law firm.  β2, the coefficient on ln(county employment), is positive and significant: as 
market size increases, a larger share of lawyers works in field-specialized firms.  The point 
estimate is 0.066, indicating that doubling market size is associated with a 4.6 percentage point 
increase in the share of lawyers working at specialized firms.  This is about one-fourth of the 
sample mean of 16.2%.  The bottom of the table contains the estimates of β1 from the bottom 
panel of Table 5, which track relationships between individual lawyer specialization and market 
size.  The ratio of the point estimates, β2/β1, equals 0.49, indicating that about half of the overall 
increase in the division of labor is happening between rather than within firms.  This indicates 
that in some cases, firms’ field scope narrows as market size increases, suggesting that firms’ 
boundaries do not merely reflect the distribution of demands. This evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that organizational trade-offs, which appear only when fields are covered by different 
individuals, influence firms’ boundaries. 
 The other three columns break things down by classes of fields as before.  In the second 
column of the top row, the dependent variable is the share of lawyers that work at an office 
where all lawyers specialize in a single ex ante business field. The coefficient on ln(county 
employment) is very small and not statistically significantly different from zero.  Table 5 
indicated that as market size increases, lawyers specialize more in these fields; this result 
provides no evidence that they are more likely to work in field-specialized firms.  The ratio β2/β1 
is approximately 0.14, indicating that practically all of the increase in the division of labor is 
occurring within rather than between firms.  In contrast, in the next column of the top row, the 
dependent variable is the share of lawyers that work at an office where all lawyers specialize in a 
single ex post business field.  Here, the coefficient on market size is positive and significant.  
From before, as market size increases, more lawyers become insurance and negligence-defendant 
specialists.  Here, we see that a substantial fraction of these specialists work in specialized law 
                                                                                                                                                             
this paper. 
   26
firms.  The ratio β2/β1 provides an estimate of this fraction: 41%.  Like the ex ante business 
fields, the division of labor increases with market size; unlike the ex ante business fields, a 
significant fraction of it happens between rather than within firms. 
 This result indicates that ex post business fields tend only to be covered in the same firm 
as other fields when they are covered by the same person, but ex ante business fields tend to be 
covered in the same firm as other fields even when they are covered by different individuals.  
Assuming that variation in our market size proxy captures differences in the size but not the 
distribution of demand, demand for services that involve each of these fields of the law exists in 
smaller markets, but the individuals supplying these services tend not to be specialized.  For 
example, lawyers who advise clients on insurance law issues might also advise clients on 
corporate and tax law issues.  When individual lawyers have multiple specialties, so do firms.  
As market size increases, lawyers specialize more: different lawyers begin to advise clients on 
different areas of the law.  As lawyers specialize, some specialties remain within the firm and 
some are spun off: the scope of the firm continues to include corporate and tax law, but it often 
no longer includes insurance law.  
 Figures 2 and 3 summarize the general patterns for ex ante and ex post business fields, 
respectively.  The top line in each represents the share of lawyers in a specialized field, and the 
bottom line represents the share of lawyers working at a field specialized law firm.  For the ex 
ante fields, the distance between the lines increases with market size; an increasing share of 
lawyers work as specialists but in non-specialized firms.  The bottom line is flat.  For the ex post 
fields, the distance between the lines increases somewhat but the bottom line is upward sloping.  
More lawyers specialize in these fields as market size increases, and an increasing share of 
lawyers work in specialized firms.   
 Finally, the last column reports results for the same exercise for the individual fields.  In 
the top panel, the coefficient on ln(county employment) is positive and significant.  The ratio 
β2/β1 equals 0.66. Lawyers specialize more in individual fields as market size increases, and 
when they do so, they work in field-specialized firms.  Firms’ boundaries thus tend to narrow as 
market size increases. 
 Table 8 provides a more detailed view.  The dependent variables in these regressions, 
analogous to the top panel of Table 7, are the share of lawyers working at firms that specialize in 
the different fields.  The contrast in Table 7 between ex ante business and other fields holds in 
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this table as well.  None of the coefficient estimates in the first row show statistically significant 
relationships between market size and the fraction of lawyers working in field-specialized firms.    
In contrast, several of the coefficients in the other rows are positive and significant, and all of the 
point estimates are larger than any of those in the first row.   
 
Full Sample Estimates and Firm Size Controls 
 Table 9 reports three sets of results.  The top panel is the same as Table 6.  The middle 
panel uses the full sample rather than the small market subsample.  Although the magnitudes of 
the estimates are lower, especially in the last column, the general pattern of the results is similar 
when including large cities and suburban counties in the analysis.  The ratio β2/β1 in the first 
column is about one-half, and as before, this ratio is higher for the individual than business 
fields, and for the ex post than the ex ante fields.  We have also run these specifications using 
only large markets (those with more than 200,000 employment; the results are reported in 
Garicano and Hubbard (2003b)), and the estimates are very similar to those in the middle panel 
here.  While the conceptual exercise is far cleaner when using the small market sample rather 
than the full sample, the results are quite similar across these samples. 
 Returning to the small market subsample, the bottom panel reports estimates of β1 and β2 
when we including a set of dummy variables that depict the number of lawyers in the office 
along with our other controls.26   Once again, the estimates of β2 are positive and significant in 
the first, third, and fourth columns.  To the extent that the point estimates of β2 change when 
including the number of lawyers dummies, they increase.  There is thus no evidence that the 
estimates in the top panel, which indicate that firms’ field scope tends to narrow as market size 
increases, reflect just “firm size effects.”27 
Summing Up 
 We conclude that firms’ boundaries change with increases in the size of demand, holding 
constant the distribution of demands. In particular, as lawyers specialize in ex post business 
fields or individual fields, these fields tend to be spun-off into separate firms.  This result is 
                                                 
26 We include 11 dummies that capture whether the law office has 1-12 lawyers, plus a dummy for whether it has 
more than 12 lawyers.  Less than 5% of the offices in the small market subsample have more than 12 lawyers. 
27 Note that the ratio β2/β1 in this panel is not interpretable in the same way as when the model is estimated without 
the size dummies.  The conceptual experiment that supports the interpretation that this ratio is the fraction of the 
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inconsistent with the hypothesis that organizational trade-offs associated with the division of 
labor do not affect firms’ boundaries, since under this hypothesis, firms’ boundaries simply 
reflect the distribution of individual demands and should not narrow as market size increases and 
individuals specialize.   
 Which specific organizational trade-offs matter in determining law firms’ boundaries? 
The fields that are spun off (individual fields and ex post business fields) have a common 
characteristic: they are mostly concerned with dispute resolution, and much of the work 
undertaken by these lawyers has to do with addressing legal problems that clients themselves can 
identify: at the individual level, a divorce, a burglary or a lawsuit; at the business level, a lawsuit 
or a complex insurance claim. On the other hand, fields that are not spun off tend to be those 
where much of lawyers’ work has to do with structuring transactions. What does this mean?  
And is there evidence that lawyers in these transactional fields tend to work in the same firm 
with each other, and not with lawyers in other fields? The following section deepens the previous 
analysis by providing evidence on which types of specialists tend to work at the same firm with 
one another and which do not.28  We then interpret these patterns in light of the knowledge-
sharing, risk-sharing, and monitoring cost hypotheses discussed above.  
 
5. The Field Composition of Law Firms 
  We develop a statistic that indicates the degree to which lawyers in one field work in the 
same firm with lawyers in other fields, relative to a benchmark in which the field-shares of 
lawyers in each firm is the same as the field-shares of lawyers in the economy.29  Let Ni be the 
number of lawyers in firm i and nij be the number of those lawyers who specialize in field j.  We 
start by computing the share of field a lawyers in the average field b lawyer’s firm.  Define this 
share as sab: 
                                                                                                                                                             
time the division of labor is mediated by markets (as depicted in Figure 1 and Section 4.1) does not hold firm size 
constant. 
28 See also Phillips and Zuckerman (2001), who analyze the determinants of whether Silicon Valley law firms’ 
scope includes family law. 
29 Previous versions of this paper (Garicano and Hubbard, 2003b), reported versions of the Ellison-Glaeser statistic 
(Ellison and Glaeser (1997)), which uses random allocation rather than a uniform distribution as a benchmark.  The 
results are very similar.  We report the uniform-benchmarked statistics described here because the magnitudes are 
more readily interpretable. 
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where all the sums are taken over i.  sab is a weighted average of the share of lawyers in field a, 
where the average is taken across all firms in the economy and the weight for each firm i is the 
share of b lawyers in the economy who work in firm i.  We then normalize sab by the share of 
lawyers in field a in the economy.  Thus for any pair of fields a and b, this statistic is: 
1ab b aab i i
a a b
i i
s n n
s s n N
Γ = = ∑∑  
Γab is the share of field a lawyers in the average field b lawyer’s firm, normalized by sa, the share 
of lawyers in field a in the economy.  It is straightforward to show that this statistic is symmetric: 
i.e.  Γab  = Γba. 
 This statistic is easy to interpret.  Γab = 1 if the share of field a lawyers in each firm 
where field b lawyers work is equal to the share of field a lawyers in the economy. If Γab > 1, 
this indicates that most field b lawyers work in firms with high shares of field a lawyers, relative 
to the share of field a lawyers in the economy. Γab = 1.30 indicates the share of field a lawyers in 
the firm where the average field b lawyer works is 30% higher than in the population as a whole.  
Γab = 0.70 indicates that it is 30% lower. 
Table 10 presents our results from this approach.  We first note four important patterns.  
First, the general pattern with the off-diagonal terms is that ex ante business specialists tend to 
work at the same firm as one another, but most other pairs of specialists tend not to do so.  Most 
of the statistics in the upper left of the figure are greater than one; most in the rest of the figure 
are less than one.  The second and third patterns are the exceptions to this rule.  The second is 
that specialists in patent law, classified as an ex ante business field, tend not to work at the same 
firm with specialists in other ex ante business fields (or any other field, for that matter).  Unlike 
other ex ante business specialists, patent lawyers tend to work in firms that are field-specialized.  
The third is that specialists in probate law, an individual field, tend to work in the same firm with 
ex ante business specialists.  In fact, they are more likely to work at the same firm as banking, 
corporate, environmental, and other ex ante business specialists than other types of individual 
specialists.  This is the exception to the general rule that specialists in business and individual-
oriented fields tend not to work at the same firm with each other.  Last, the diagonal terms are 
systematically greater than the off-diagonal terms.  Some of this is artificial, since part of the 
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high value of the diagonal reflects that specialists always work at firms where the share of their 
own field is positive – their firm reflects themselves.  At the bottom of the table we report 
statistics for the diagonal terms that do not include this effect; these statistics remain greater than 
any of the associated off-diagonal terms. Lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with 
lawyers in their own field than with lawyers in any other field.  This reflects groups of partners 
and associates in the same field working at the same firm.30  
Broadly, these patterns provide no support for the hypothesis that law firms’ field 
boundaries strongly reflect the risk-sharing benefits of revenue-sharing arrangements.  Lawyers 
in the same field or fields where demands are closely related tend to work at the same firm more 
than lawyers in fields where demands are less closely related.  Demand for the services supplied 
by banking, corporate, real estate, and other ex ante business fields is likely positively correlated, 
but specialists in these fields tend to work at the same firm with each other. 
It is also difficult to explain these patterns with a monitoring-based theory that 
emphasizes cognitive connections across fields.  Although some of the ex ante business fields 
have strong cognitive connections with each other, others do not.  For example, corporate law 
has some doctrinal overlap with banking law, but is largely distinct from other ex ante business 
fields such as environmental law and real estate law.  It is unlikely that the legal expertise of 
corporate law specialists provides them a comparative advantage in monitoring lawyers in these 
other fields. 
Some empirical justification for these claims about cognitive relationships across fields is 
evident in Heinz, et al (1998), who analyze the “patterns of co-practice” of the 788 randomly-
selected Chicago-based lawyers in the “Chicago Lawyers II” database described above.  These 
data contain detailed information on how individual lawyers, including non-specialists, allocate 
their time among fields.  One would expect non-specialists’ field coverage to reflect some 
combination of the scope of clients’ demands and scope economies in learning.  The latter would 
be derived from fields’ cognitive closeness: if banking and corporate law are cognitively close, 
one would expect lawyers who spend some of their time addressing problems in banking law to 
also spend some of their time addressing problems in corporate law.  Conversely, observing that 
few or no lawyers spend time in both corporate and environmental law is consistent with the 
                                                 
30 Garicano and Hubbard (2003c) study partner-associate ratios and how they vary with returns to specialization.  
This paper investigates more thoroughly the organization of specialists in the same field. 
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hypothesis that these fields are not close in this way.  Heinz and Laumann (1998) find that, 
indeed, an extremely small share of lawyers that spend at least 5% of their time in corporate law 
also spend at least 5% of their time in environmental law, and vice-versa.  This is not because all 
lawyers who do work in these fields are specialists: these authors’ results indicate that it is not 
unusual for lawyers to spend at least 5% of their time in both corporate law and other fields such 
as banking or tax law, and it is not unusual for lawyers to spend at least 5% of their time in 
environmental law and other fields such as negligence-defense.  Similar results hold when 
examining connections between corporate and real estate law, and between corporate and 
government-related subfields such as utilities law and municipal law.  These patterns of co-
practice provide no support for the hypothesis that corporate law has a close cognitive 
connection to environmental, real estate, or government law.  We thus conclude that it is unlikely 
that the patterns in Table 10 reflect that monitoring costs are low among specialists in the ex ante 
business fields because of their fields’ cognitive closeness.31 
In contrast, our evidence does not allow us to reject a different hypothesis about the 
source of monitoring-related scope economies, namely that they have to do with client- rather 
than field-specific factors.  For example, client knowledge required to structure a transaction 
(such as location of the firm being bought, type of firm, history of the firm) is used by all the 
lawyers involved in the transaction and this shared knowledge base may allow cheaper 
monitoring across those lawyers.  Free-rider problems associated with organizing these fields 
within the same firm may be lower as a consequence.  Such a theory would leave open the issue 
of why the monitoring-related benefits of shared client knowledge do not extend to the ex post 
business fields as well.  It is possible that such benefits only apply when lawyers are working 
with clients at the same time. 
Finally, our data are consistent with certain hypotheses regarding firms’ role with respect 
to knowledge-sharing.  First, fields may be grouped in order to facilitate the exchange of 
substantive knowledge – legal expertise or facts about the client -- between lawyers in different 
fields.  This can easily explain some patterns in our data: for example, why ex ante business 
specialists (except patent lawyers) tend to work in the same firm with each other.  This version of 
                                                 
31 Heinz, et al’s (1998) results are similar to those in Heinz and Laumann (1982), which analyzes data from 1975.  
One of these authors’ main inferences is the point we make here: the organization of legal services does not simply 
reflect cognitive relationships between fields. 
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the knowledge-sharing theory has a more difficult time explaining why these business specialists 
tend not to work at the same firm as specialists in negligence-defense or insurance law, unless 
substantive or client knowledge that is useful in organizing transactions is not useful in litigation 
and vice-versa.   
Second, fields may be grouped to facilitate the exchange of knowledge about 
opportunities – referrals -- across field-specialized lawyers.  The patterns in our data could 
reflect differences in the value of cross-field referrals.  This version of the knowledge-sharing 
hypothesis can more easily explain the split between ex ante and ex post fields.  One would 
expect knowledge-sharing about opportunities to be more valuable across ex ante fields than ex 
post fields if clients’ ability to assess the scope of their legal problem – their ability to self-refer -
-  differs with the timing of demand.  Clients demand ex ante services in anticipation of potential 
future disputes among parties or conflicts with the law; these problems often potentially can 
involve many different areas of the law.  (Does this deal have important tax implications or 
create regulatory problems?)  Legal expertise is valuable for determining which of these areas 
are important.  In contrast, it tends to be less difficult for clients demanding ex post services to 
determine the range of relevant legal expertise.  The interaction between a client's situation and 
the law is often clear, even to non-experts.  For example, expertise in insurance law is valuable 
for a company with a complicated insurance claim; expertise in torts is valuable to a company 
being sued for negligence.  While legal expertise is generally valuable for such clients, referrals 
across specialists in different areas of the law tend not to be because the scope of most clients' 
legal problems is well-defined at this point in contractual time.  If this is true, this could explain 
why lawyers in ex ante fields tend to work in the same firm with each other, while lawyers in ex 
post fields tend to work in field-specialized firms.  It could also explain the exceptions to the 
general empirical pattern.  Patent law is fairly distinct from other areas of the law, and is 
probably an exception to the rule that clients have difficulty judging the scope of services they 
need for ex ante problems.  Referrals between ex ante business specialists and probate lawyers 
may be valuable, as when the senior management of corporate clients needs help arranging wills 
and estates. 
In contrast, this version of the knowledge sharing theory does not explain why lawyers in 
the same field tend to work with each other in the same firm (the diagonal pattern in Table 10), if 
it is the case that such lawyers’ expertise is the same and lawyers face no time constraints.  In 
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such situations, referrals across lawyers would be not valuable and one would not expect to 
observe that, for example, corporate law specialists work in the same firm as other corporate law 
specialists.  We make the following observations.  First, it is highly likely that there are within-
field differences in lawyers’ expertise that are not picked up in our data: for example, corporate 
lawyers vary in their ability and sometimes sub-specialize within corporate law (e.g., in 
securities law).  Second, lawyers do face time constraints, and this may make referrals valuable 
even among lawyers with the same expertise.  Either of these conditions could reconcile this fact 
with the “referrals” version of the knowledge sharing theory, although this fact could have other 
explanations as well. 
In sum, while this evidence does not allow us to establish a particular organization-
theoretic explanation for law firms’ field boundaries, it allows us to eliminate risk-sharing as an 
important element and puts some structure on the type of monitoring or knowledge sharing 
hypotheses that are compatible with our data.  Risk-sharing theories or monitoring theories that 
emphasize fields’ cognitive closeness cannot explain major patterns in our data.  Monitoring 
theories or knowledge-sharing theories that rest on the value of shared client knowledge can 
explain many patterns in our data, but require additional (but perhaps reasonable) elements to 
explain the split between the ex ante and ex post business fields.  As established earlier, firms’ 
boundaries do not simply reflect the scope of clients’ demands; these additional elements must 
therefore explain why shared client knowledge is valuable among some, but not all, a client’s 
lawyers.  Finally, theories in which firms facilitate the exchange of economic opportunities can 
easily explain most of the patterns we uncover with respect to firms’ field scope, including the 
division between ex ante and ex post fields, but require additional (but once again perhaps 
reasonable) assumptions to explain why a specialist in one field is more likely to work with a 
specialist in the same field than with one in any other field. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Economists have long recognized that economic activity is organized, in part, to exploit 
increasing returns.  For example, a large literature in industrial organization analyzes 
relationships between industry structure and scale economies; these economies are generally 
depicted as arising from fixed costs associated with physical capital.  But physical capital is not 
the only source of increasing returns that can affect how production is organized into firms.  
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Rosen (1983) emphasizes that there are increasing returns to human capital, as the cost of 
learning a skill is independent of its subsequent utilization rate.  It follows that the organization 
of industries where production is knowledge-intensive should reflect problems associated with 
exploiting returns to human capital specialization.  That is, it should reflect trade-offs that have 
traditionally been examined in the economics of organizations literature starting with Coase 
(1937) rather than the industry structure literature. 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on how one human-capital-intensive 
industry, legal services, is organized.  Our evidence indicates that organizational trade-offs affect 
firms’ field scope: firms’ field scope tends to narrow as market size increases and lawyers 
specialize.  Firms’ boundaries reflect not just the scope of clients’ demands, but also how 
relationships between lawyers are optimally organized. Moreover, this pattern varies across 
fields.  As market size increases, the division of labor between lawyers in fields involved in 
structuring transactions tends be mediated within firms.  In this segment of the market, firms’ 
scope does not narrow as market size increases.  In contrast, the division of labor between 
lawyers in fields involved in dispute resolution and litigation and lawyers in other fields tends to 
be mediated by markets.  Firms’ boundaries narrow with market size as individuals become more 
specialized; in larger markets, these services tend to be supplied by lawyers in field-specialized 
firms.  These and other patterns are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms’ field boundaries 
reflect variation in the benefits of risk-sharing or the cognitive relationships between fields.  
They are consistent with theories that emphasize firms’ role in facilitating the exchange of 
knowledge, and some variants of theories in which shared client knowledge lowers specialists’ 
costs of monitoring each other.  Distinguishing further among these theories probably will 
require direct evidence on referral and monitoring patterns, evidence that our data cannot 
provide.   
 These findings have implications for the industry structure. Two notable features of the 
legal services industry in the United States are that the average firm size is small, and that the 
size distribution of firms is highly skewed: even within large markets, the largest firms have 
many times more lawyers than the median firm. Our findings suggest that the incentive trade-
offs associated with exploiting increasing returns from specialization in this industry differ 
across fields, and help lead the structure of the industry to be fragmented, but highly-skewed. 
The fragmentation results from the fact that, for the reasons we discuss above, the division of 
   35
labor between lawyers in different fields is usually best mediated by markets.  The skewness in 
part reflects that relationships between lawyers in ex ante fields such as corporate, tax, and real 
estate law are often best mediated by firms.  Future research is needed to investigate how the 
organizational trade-offs that shape the structure of the legal services industry – including those 
associated with knowledge sharing and monitoring – influence the structure of other human-
capital-intensive industries. 
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  Table 1
Summary Statistics -- Lawyers, Law Offices, and Law Firms
Lawyers Offices Firms
N 219033 26151 23465
Average Number of Lawyers 3.56 3.65
Share Specialized 0.71 0.37 0.28
Share Multiestablishment 0.28 0.05 0.02
Averages and shares computed using sampling weights supplied by the Bureau of the Census.
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Table 2
Shares of Lawyers in Specialized Fields, Offices, and Firms
Share of Lawyers Share of Lawyers Share of Lawyers Fraction of Specialists
In Specialized Fields In Specialized Offices In Specialized Firms In Specialized Firms
Ex Ante Business Field 0.270 0.047 0.044 17.4%
Banking 0.047 0.006 0.005 12.9%
Corporate 0.083 0.004 0.004 4.8%
Environmental 0.016 0.001 0.001 6.2%
Governmental 0.015 0.002 0.002 13.7%
Patent 0.020 0.014 0.014 70.4%
Real Estate 0.062 0.014 0.013 22.7%
Tax 0.028 0.005 0.005 17.9%
Ex Post Business Field 0.128 0.044 0.044 34.5%
Insurance 0.061 0.025 0.023 40.8%
Negligence-Defendant 0.066 0.018 0.018 27.2%
Other Specialized Field 0.155
Individual Field 0.158 0.071 0.071 44.9%
Criminal 0.024 0.012 0.012 49.7%
Domestic Relations 0.026 0.009 0.009 34.8%
Negligence-Plaintiff 0.074 0.042 0.041 57.1%
Probate 0.035 0.008 0.008 23.1%
General Practice 0.289
All shares computed using Census-provided sampling weights.  
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Table 3
Share of Time on Business Clients, Days per Month in State or Federal Court
Selected Fields
Share of Time Days per Month N
Specialty Business Clients In State or Federal
(percent) Court
Commercial Law: Banking 91.3 6.4 8
General Corporate 86.1 1.8 12
Municipal Law 35.6 0.5 6
Environmental Law 82.3 2.8 12
Real Estate 69.9 2.9 43
Tax 64.7 1.3 32
Patents, Trademarks or Copyrights 89.8 2.0 25
Personal Injury -- Defendant 88.3 11.6 20
Personal Injury -- Plaintiff 7.6 13.9 16
Criminal 10.0 16.7 9
Divorce (including family, adoption, etc.) 8.0 16.7 7
Probate (wills and trusts) 3.8 6.0 4
Source: Chicago Lawyers II survey.
Fields are as listed on Chicago Lawyers II survey forms.  
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Table 4
Share of Revenues from Individual Clients and Market Size
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Law Office's Revenues That Come From Clients Who Are Individuals.
Employment 20K-100K -9.77 -2.59 -8.75 1.04
(1.88) (2.02) (1.47) (2.03)
Employment 100K-200K -13.14 -1.05 -20.27 -4.00
(2.27) (3.31) (2.49) (2.90)
Employment 200K-400K -17.99 0.45 -27.50 -5.97
(9.33) (8.27) (2.23) (3.37)
Employment 400K-1M -36.19 -11.85
(3.09) (4.11)
Employment > 1M -43.74 -19.11
(2.76) (4.31)
ln(employment) -1.57 -4.42
(1.07) (0.82)
C
Includes Controls? N Y Y N Y Y
N
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
The number of observations differs from that in other results because of missing values for the dependent variable.
Small Market Subsample Full Sample
249845780
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Table 5
Market Size and Lawyer Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Any Specialized Ex Ante Ex Post Individual
Field Business Field Business Field Field
ln(county employment) 0.137 0.042 0.037 0.031
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
C 0.328 0.094 0.048 0.150
(0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
ln(county employment) 0.136 0.029 0.027 0.047
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
sh(mfg) -0.188 0.090 -0.005 -0.053
(0.182) (0.079) (0.065) (0.144)
sh(trans/util) 0.063 -0.461 0.364 0.325
(0.478) (0.263) (0.193) (0.376)
sh(wholesale) 0.482 -0.360 0.641 0.075
(0.445) (0.247) (0.195) (0.391)
sh(retail) 0.217 0.033 -0.114 0.520
(0.294) (0.172) (0.137) (0.255)
sh(FIRE) 1.153 1.193 0.318 -0.416
(0.825) (0.545) (0.419) (0.698)
sh(services) -0.059 0.019 0.257 -0.062
(0.269) (0.142) (0.118) (0.207)
state capital -0.021 -0.022 -0.034 -0.001
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025)
emp/estab -- construction -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0040 -0.0003
(0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0002)
emp/estab -- mfg -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
emp/estab -- trans/util -0.0007 0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0015
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0013)
emp/estab -- wholesale -0.0011 0.0031 -0.0023 0.0011
(0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0031)
emp/estab -- retail 0.0066 0.0028 0.0064 -0.0046
(0.0072) (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0051)
emp/estab -- FIRE -0.0064 -0.0033 -0.0013 0.0009
(0.0053) (0.0033) (0.0026) (0.0043)
emp/estab -- services -0.0030 -0.0001 -0.0031 0.0002
(0.0052) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0035)
C 0.291 0.023 -0.095 0.090
(0.160) (0.069) (0.061) (0.135)
N=6032
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 6
Market Size and Lawyer Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Ex Ante Business Specialties
Share Share Share Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Banking Corporate Environmental Governmental Patent Real Estate Tax
ln(county employment) 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Ex Post Business Specialties
Share Share
Dependent Variable Insurance Negligence-Def
ln(county employment) 0.022 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Individual Specialties
Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Criminal Domestic Rel. Negligence-Pla Probate
ln(county employment) 0.009 0.004 0.026 0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
N=6032
All regressions contain segment shares, average employment size within segments, state capital as controls.
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.  
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Table 7
Market Size, Lawyer, and Law Firm Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Any Specialty Ex Ante Ex Post Individual
Business Specialty Business Specialty Speciality
Market Size and Law Office Specialization Regressions (Beta2)
ln(county employment) 0.066 0.004 0.011 0.031
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Market Size and Individual Specialization Regressions (Beta1)
ln(county employment) 0.136 0.029 0.027 0.047
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Beta2/Beta1 0.49 0.14 0.41 0.66
Controls include share of employment in 7 major sectors, average establishment size within each of these
sectors, and a state capital dummy
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.  
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Table 8
Market Size and Law Firm Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Estimates of Beta2, by Field
Ex Ante Business Fields
Share Share Share Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Banking Corporate Environmental Governmental Patent Real Estate Tax
ln(county employment) -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ex Post Business Fields
Share Share
Dependent Variable Insurance Negligence-Def
ln(county employment) 0.008 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Individual Fields
Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Criminal Domestic Rel. Negligence-Pla Probate
ln(county employment) 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
N=26131
All regressions contain segment shares, average employment size within segments, state capital as controls.
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.  
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Table 9
Market Size, Lawyer, and Law Firm Specialization
Alternative Specifications
Share Share Share Share
Dependent Variable Any Specialty Ex Ante Ex Post Individual
Business Specialty Business Specialty Speciality
Small Market Subsample
Beta2 0.066 0.004 0.011 0.031
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Beta1 0.136 0.029 0.027 0.047
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Full Sample
Beta2 0.039 0.000 0.012 0.019
(0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Beta1 0.083 0.020 0.021 0.017
(0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Small Market Subsample, Includes "Number of Lawyers in the Office" Dummies
Beta2 0.080 0.006 0.013 0.039
(0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Beta1 0.117 0.015 0.014 0.054
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
Beta1 is the coefficient on ln(county employment) in regressions where the dependent variable is the share of 
individuals who are specialized.
Beta2 is the coefficient on ln(county employment) in regressions where the dependent variable is the share of 
individuals who work in field-specialized firms.
Controls include share of employment in 7 major sectors, average establishment size within each of these
sectors, and a state capital dummy.  In the bottom panel, we also include 11 dummy variables that capture whether law
office has 2-12 lawyers, plus a dummy for whether it has more than 12 lawyers.  
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 10
Normalized Composition of Law Firms
By Field
B
a
n
k
i
n
g
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
T
a
x
R
e
a
l
 
E
s
t
a
t
e
P
a
t
e
n
t
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
N
e
g
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
-
D
e
f
e
n
d
a
n
t
C
r
i
m
i
n
a
l
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
N
e
g
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
-
P
l
a
i
n
t
i
f
f
P
r
o
b
a
t
e
O
t
h
e
r
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
P
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
Banking 7.52
Corporate 1.27 4.42
Government 1.06 1.26 24.28
Environmental 1.34 1.50 2.36 13.61
Tax 1.18 1.84 1.13 1.39 10.90
Real Estate 1.44 1.18 0.85 0.96 1.07 6.79
Patent 0.35 0.63 0.42 0.62 0.53 0.25 39.05
Insurance 0.61 0.50 0.56 0.99 0.37 0.35 0.01 11.75
Neg-Def 0.73 0.65 0.71 1.04 0.60 0.54 0.17 0.58 9.83
Criminal 0.33 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.07 0.19 0.19 26.97
Domestic 0.61 0.49 0.80 0.47 0.40 0.74 0.07 0.30 0.33 1.61 20.80
Neg-Pla 0.64 0.31 0.37 0.26 0.22 0.60 0.05 0.14 0.37 0.84 0.78 10.03
Probate 0.97 1.12 0.81 0.86 1.62 1.27 0.22 0.52 0.64 0.59 1.10 0.43 11.31
Other 0.65 1.05 0.73 1.02 0.89 0.68 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.38 0.18 0.53 4.20
Gen Prac 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.29 0.13 0.29 0.18 2.95
Diagonal 4.47 3.48 13.93 10.38 3.73 2.63 32.62 9.95 8.23 6.43 5.95 4.50 3.02 2.83 1.38
(colleagues only)
Bold indicates values greater than 1.00.
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Figure 1 
Specialization and Organizational Trade-Offs 
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Figure 2 
Share of Lawyers in Specialized Fields, Field Specialized Firms 
Ex Ante Business Fields 
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Figure 3 
Share of Lawyers in Specialized Fields, Field Specialized Firms 
Ex Post Business Fields 
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Appendix 1 
Survey Form 
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Appendix 2 
List of Single-County MSAs in Small Market Sample 
 
Abilene, TX 
Albuquerque, NM 
Alexandria, LA 
Altoona, PA 
Anchorage, AK 
Anderson, IN 
Anderson, SC 
Anniston, AL 
Asheville, NC 
Bakersfield, CA 
Battle Creek, MI 
Bellingham, WA 
Benton Harbor, MI 
Billings, MT 
Bloomington, IN 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 
Boise City, ID 
Bradenton, FL 
Bremerton, WA 
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 
Bryan-College Station, TX 
Burlington, NC 
Casper, WY 
Cedar Rapids, IA 
Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 
Cheyenne, WY 
Chico, CA 
Colorado Springs, CO 
Columbia, MO 
Daytona Beach, FL 
Decatur, IL 
Dubuque, IA 
El Paso, TX 
Elmira, NY 
Enid, OK 
Erie, PA 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 
Fayetteville, NC 
Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 
Flint, MI 
Florence, SC 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 
Fresno, CA 
Gadsden, AL 
Grand Forks, ND 
Great Falls, MT 
Greeley, CO 
Green Bay, WI 
Hagerstown, MD 
Huntsville, AL 
Iowa City, IA 
Jackson, MI 
Jackson, TN 
Jacksonville, NC 
Jamestown-Dunkurk, NY 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 
Kalamazoo, MI 
Kankakee, IL 
La Crosse, WI 
Lafayette-West Lafayette, IN 
Lake Charles, LA 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
Lancaster, PA 
Laredo, TX 
Las Cruces, NM 
Lawrence, KS 
Lawton, OK 
Lincoln, NE 
Lubbock, TX 
Madison, WI 
Mansfield, OH 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 
Medford, OR 
Melbourne-Titusville, FL 
Merced, CA 
Midland, TX 
Modesto, CA 
Monroe, LA 
Muncie, IN 
Muskegon, MI 
Naples, FL 
Ocala, FL 
Odessa, TX 
Olympia, WA 
Owensboro, KY 
Panama City, FL 
Pascagoula, MS 
Pine Bluff, AR 
Poughkeepsie, NY 
Provo-Orem, UT 
Pueblo, CO 
Rapid City, SD 
Reading, PA 
Redding, CA 
Reno, NV 
Rochester, MN 
St Joseph, MO 
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA 
San Angelo, TX 
Sarasota, FL 
Sharon, PA 
Sheboygan, WI 
Sioux Falls, SD 
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 
Spokane, WA 
State College, PA 
Stockton, CA 
Topeka, KS 
Tucson, AZ 
Tuscaloosa, AL 
Tyler, TX 
Victoria, TX 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 
Waco, TX 
Wausau, WI 
W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 
Wichita Falls, TX 
Williamsport, PA 
Wilmington, NC 
Yakima, WA 
Yuma, AZ 
 
Note: The small market sample also includes all law offices located in  non-MSAs. 
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